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Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the performance of Nigeria’s agricultural credit policies with a 
view  to  unearthing the  factors  responsible  for the  poor loan  performance.  The  findings  reveal  that  although 
Nigeria’s agricultural sector is abysmally underfunded with an unproductive federal budget structure that have 
been detrimental to agricultural productivity, the basic factor responsible for poor loan performance has been 
the  failure  to  match  credit  with  seasons.  From  the  analysis  of  loans  and  disbursement  flow  to  agricultural 
sector,  it  was  discovered  that  loan  are  paid  to  farmers  with  utter  disregard  to  the  seasons.  Evidently,  the 
mismatch  of  credit  disbursement  with  seasons  attenuated  growth  and  productivity  of  agriculture  in  Nigeria, 
resulting  in  poor  loan  performance.  We  recommend  the  adoption  of  the  seasonality  model,  an  innovative 
strategy, which  is capable of solving the problem of default in agricultural financing and as such aiding  the 
process of enhanced agricultural productivity and national development.  
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I. Introduction 
 Devising appropriate development strategy that will capture the financial services requirement of 
farmers, especially the poor and small-scale producers, who constitute over 70 percent of the Nigerian 
population is a major challenge facing the country. The need to develop agriculture cannot be over emphasized 
as the sector holds the key that drives economic growth, wealth creation and poverty reduction. The sector 
contributed about 31% of GDP and 60% of employment in 2011 (table 1). The Federal and state governments in 
Nigeria have long recognized the need for sustainable growth and development of the economy through the 
financial empowerment of farmers. This is based on the understanding that if the growth strategy of raising 
agricultural productivity through the financial empowerment of farmers is adopted, and the latent capabilities of 
this large segment of the Nigerian population is sufficiently harnessed and sustained, then positive multiplier 
will be experienced throughout the economy. To give force to this aspiration, various policies have been 
instituted by successive administrations to improve the country’s agricultural production capabilities and put the 
sector in the front burner of government development strategy.  
 Despite barrage of policies targeted at providing low-cost loans to bolster agricultural productivity and 
seemingly huge government expenditure in the sector, results seem to be scanty. Nigeria was once a large 
exporter of agricultural products and the sector was the major foreign exchange earner before the discovery of 
Crude oil in the 1970s. The country is currently a huge net importer of agricultural products, with such imports 
exceeding $3 billion in 2010 (GAIN, 2011:2). The performance of agricultural loan in Nigeria appears to be 
abysmal. But the country has the potential to return to its previous position if adequate attention is given to 
agricultural credit policies and programmes. 
 This paper develops a model of agricultural loan disbursement, the seasonality model, which not only 
offers the most plausible explanation for non-performing agricultural loan facilities in Nigeria, but promises the 
panacea to agricultural loan delinquency and low productivity. The paper is divided into five sections. 
Following the introduction, section 2 focuses on government policies and programmes aimed at channeling 
low-cost funds to the agricultural sector in order boast productivity in the sector. This section also highlights the 
operations and achievements of these programmes. Section 3 presents and discusses the performance profile of 
major agricultural credit policies and overall agricultural productivity in Nigeria’s history. Section 4 discusses 
the Seasonality Model (SM). In section 5, we present a summary of major findings and the implication for 
policy. 
 
II. Review of Key Government Programmes aimed at   Providing Cheap Loans for Agricultural 
Development in Nigeria 
 Government policies to bring credit to the under-banked sector of the economy are biased towards 
developing agriculture. The policies include the establishment of schemes, programmes, and institutions to 
address and deliver government’s intentions in the sector (Eze et al, 2010:6). Some of these are encapsulated in 
the national development plan and budgets. But an important instrument used by the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) in assisting the financing of agriculture is its credit guideline embodied in its Monetary Policy Circulars 
  
 
(MPCs). The first   MPC was issued in 1969 and since then, the CBN has consistently given preferential 
treatment to agriculture. Both the volume of loan allocated to the sector and the interest rate chargeable on such 
loans are covered by the preferential treatment. In 1985, for instance, the share of agriculture in commercial 
bank loans and advances to the agricultural sector was increased from 10% to 12% to facilitate the increased 
output expected from the sector (Ike, 1986:411; CBN’s MPC, 1985). The current Monetary Policy Circular 
(MPC no. 39) which covers the 2012/2013 fiscal years also provides that the 40% interest rebate under 
ACGSF’s Interest Drawback Programme (IDP) shall continue to be paid to farmers (who liquidate their loan 
that were borrowed at market determined rates as at when due) in 2013.Similarly, under the Agricultural Credit 
Support Scheme (ACSS), Farmers who pay back their facilities on schedule are to further enjoy a rebate of 6%, 
thus reducing the effective interest rate from 14% to 8% (CBN 2012: MPC no.39, p.40). In terms of government 
policies to administer low-cost loans for improved agricultural productivity, the following institutions, schemes 
and programmes are discernable. 
 
2.1 ‘Agricultural Institutions’ for providing low-cost Credit to Farmers in Nigeria 
i. Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank (NACB) and Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and 
Rural Development Bank (NACRDB) 
 In order to enable money deposit banks meet the targets set for them in the Monetary Policy Circular, 
the NACB was established in 1973 as a private limited liability company to provide high level and quality credit 
to all aspect of agricultural production (including horticulture, poultry farming, pig breeding, fishery, forestry 
and timber production), enhance the availability of storage facilities, and promote marketing of agricultural 
products through the liberalization of credit to farmers. According to Ike (1986: 412), the NACB was intended 
to provide medium to long term financing for agriculture.  This was because of the reluctance of commercial 
banks to provide this type of financing for agriculture and the general mismanagement and abuse which 
characterized government loans to farmers channeled through the state credit institutions. In 2002, the 
NACRDB was born out of the merger of NACB, Peoples Bank of Nigeria (PBN), and Family Economic 
Advancement Programme (FEAP) (Ojiako and Ogbukwa 2012: 2053). As we see in Eze et al (2010: 11), 
although NACRDB now collect deposits, it has not lived up to expectation due to poor funding. 
 
ii. Nigerian Agricultural Insurance Corporation (NAIC), (1987 to date) 
The NAIC was established to provide insurance cover for all types of farming and farming related activities, 
including insurance for stock in transit. The premium paid on NAIC policy is heavily subsidized by the CBN to 
make it affordable for small holder farmers. The indemnity paid in the event of occurrence of a risk that has 
been insured helps in ploughing the farmer back to business. 
 
iii. Microfinance Banks (2005 to date) 
As we see in GAIN (2012:6), microfinance brings financial services such as savings, deposit, payments, 
transfers, micro insurance and micro leasing to the active (or productive) poor and low income people, who 
would otherwise have no access to such services. The Microfinance Policy outlines the principles and 
guidelines for the practice of microfinance in Nigeria, including provision for the establishment of private sector 
driven microfinance banks with market-centered operations. A veritable source of loanable funds for 
microfinance banks is the Micro Credit Fund.  The specific objectives of the Nigerian microfinance policy are 
to: 
(a) make financial services accessible to a large segment of the potentially productive Nigerian population 
 which otherwise would have little or no access to financial services;  
(b) promote synergy and mainstreaming of the informal subsector into the national financial system; 
(c) enhance service delivery by Microfinance institutions to micro, small , and medium entrepreneurs; and 
(d) contribute to rural transformation and promote linkage programmes between universal and 
 development banks, specialized institutions and microfinance banks.  
 According to Eze et al (2010: 10), the micro finance banks are of two types ; those licensed to operate 
as a unit bank with capital base of N20 million and those licensed to operate in a state with capital base of N1 
billion. Some modest success has been achieved, especially through the MFIs that are supported by NGOs. The 
limitation with NGO-MFIs is that they are prohibited from mobilizing deposits and find it difficult to grow 
 
(iv) Community banking programme (1991 to 2007) 
 This programme provided for the establishment of community banks with a focus on rural banking 
operations. The National Board for Community Banks (NBCB) was the regulator of these banks until 2002 
when this function was transferred to the CBN. It was intended to serve communities that were able to establish 
one based on personal recognition, character and credit worthiness of the borrower. 
  
 
Other institutions include the River Basin Development Authority, 1977 to date; Directorate for Foods, Roads 
and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), 1986 to 1993; and People’s Bank of Nigeria, 1990 to 2002, among others 
(Ekong and Onye 2012).The River Basin Development Authority was established in view of the importance of 
collecting data on River Niger and Benue. It was meant to undertake laboratory analysis of salt and silt water as 
well as the models of water control projects in the country. This was needful in view of the agricultural and 
navigational benefits that could be derived from result of such analysis as a basis for planning. DFRRI, 
established in 1986 through the promulgation of Decree No.4 of 1987, was to construct and maintain rural roads 
to provide the link between the farm produce and the market, promote agricultural production through the 
provision of inputs (seedling, fertilizers and equipment) and the provide rural housing. The scheme was unable 
to meet the set target due to high level of corruption and duplication of functions and was scrapped in 1993. The 
Peoples of Nigeria was essentially created to provide micro credit of N250, 000 or less to clients (at a service 
charge of 20%) who should have compulsory savings of 30% of the loan on hand before they can access the 
facility. 
 
2.2 ‘Agricultural Schemes’ for Providing Low-cost Credit to Farmers in Nigeria  
i. Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund (ACGSF), (1978 to date) 
 In a study conducted in 1976 by the CBN, shortage of primary production credit was identified as one 
of the major causes of declining agricultural production. The shortage of credit was attributed to reluctance by 
Banks to lend to the real sector, especially agricultural production due to perceived risk in the sector, high cost 
of administration of agricultural loans and inability of farmers to provide the necessary collateral, among others. 
As a probable solution to this problem, the ACGSF was established in 1977 (via Decree No. 20 but started 
operation in 1978) by the Federal Government of Nigeria (60%) and CBN (40%) with an initial Fund of N100 
million and Paid up capital of N85million (Olaitan 2006:3). The capital base of the fund was increased to 
N3billion in March 2001.The CBN handles the day-to-day operations of the fund through its Development 
Finance Departments/Offices in all the states of the federation and is responsible to the board of the fund. The 
fund guarantees credit facilities extended to farmers (for approved agricultural projects) by banks up to 75% of 
the amount in default net the amount realized from the security pledged by the borrower.  
Between 1978 and 1989 when the government stipulated lending quotas for banks under the scheme, 
there was consistent increase in the lending portfolios of banks to agriculture (table 2), but after the deregulation 
of the financial system, banks started reducing their loans to the sector due to the perceived risk. For instance, 
the amount of loan guaranteed under the fund dropped below N100 million from 1990 till 1993. In order to 
reverse the declining trend, certain incentives and palliatives, such as the Interest Draw Back (IDB) programme, 
the Trust Fund Model and Self-Help Group Linkage Banking were introduced (CBN 2013). Interest rate under 
the ACGSF is market determined, but as earlier noted, the CBN offers a rebate equivalent to 40% of the loan 
interest when loans are fully repaid on schedule. The scheme deals mainly with small farmers who need small 
loan to operate (Eze 2010: 6). But there are also big borrowers under the ACGSF. 
 
ii. Commercial Agriculture Credit Scheme (CACS), (2009 to date) 
 As part of its developmental role, the CBN in collaboration with the Federal Ministry of agriculture 
and Water Resources (FMA&WR) in 2009 established the CACS to provide finance for the country’s 
agricultural value chain (production, processing, storage and marketing). The primary objectives of the scheme 
are to: 
(a) Fast track the development of the agricultural sector by providing credit facilities to large-scale commercial 
farmers at a single digit interest rate; 
(b) Enhance food security by increasing food supply, thereby promoting low food inflation; 
(c) Reduce the cost of credit in agricultural production to enable farmers exploit the untapped potentials of the 
sector; and 
(d) Increase output, generate employment, diversify Nigeria’s revenue base, raise the level of foreign exchange 
earnings and provide input for manufacturing and processing on a sustainable basis. 
 The CACS which is a sub-component of the Federal Government of Nigeria’s Commercial Agriculture 
Development Scheme (CADP) is financed through a N200 billion Bond raised through the Debt Management 
Office (DMO). Loans under the CACS are disbursed at a maximum interest of 9%. The subsidy arising from the 
divergence between the stipulated rate and the market rate on all loans granted, and the administrative expenses 
of the scheme are borne by the CBN. The day-to-day implementation of the scheme is carried out by a 
Technical Implementation Committee (TIC) made up of the director of the Development Finance Department of 
the CBN as the chairman, head of the agricultural credit support division of the CBN, and a consulting Group as 
members; and the programme coordinator of the commercial Agriculture Development Programme of the 
  
 
Federal Government as the Secretary. The first tranche of the scheme ran from May to December, 2009 while 
the second tranche commenced in February, 2010 and is still ongoing. 
   
CACS Performance by Value Chain 
 A March, 2012 report by the CBN on the activities of the N200 billion CACS shows that the scheme 
have financed a total of 193 private sector and 29 state sponsored projects. Out of the 193 private sector 
sponsored projects, production accounted for 47% and dominated the activities funded while processing 
accounted for 39%. Table 3 indicates a further disaggregation of CACS financed projects by Value Chain. 
 
Table 3: Analysis of CACS Financed Projects by Value Chain 
 
Category Number of Projects(% of Projects) Value (N'billions and %) 
Input 
Supplies 1 (1%) 1.7 (1%) 
Production 90 (47%) 45.6 (32%) 
Processing 76 (39%) 73.99 (52%) 
Marketing 16 (8%) 15.31 (11%) 
Storage 
10 (5%) 5.9 (4%) 
Total 193 142.53 
 
 The CBN (2012:16) report on its real sector interventions in Nigeria show that the CACS has impacted 
the economy in the following areas: 
(a) over 38,711 new jobs has been created; 
(b) 10 new oil palm processing companies producing 368,188mt of refined oil per annum was established; 
(c) over 10% of national rice demand are produced by CACS beneficiaries; and 
(d) through the scheme, the Savannah Sugar Company Ltd Numan Adamawa State has raised Sugar 
 Cane output from 40,000 to 50,000 metric tons.   
Whether or not these strides suffice for the target set for the CACS is debatable. Other schemes include the 
Refinancing and Rediscounting Facility, 2006 till date; Large Scale Agricultural Credit Scheme, 2009; and the 
supervised agricultural Loan Board. 
 
iii. N50 billion Agricultural Credit Support Scheme (ACSS), (2006 till date) 
 The ACSS is an initiative of the Federal Government and the Central Bank of Nigeria with the active 
support and participation of the Bankers’ committee. The initial ACSS fund of N50billion was established with 
contributions from the CBN and deposit money banks for the financing of large agricultural projects such as 
establishment or management of plantations, cultivation or production of crops and livestock. The borrowing 
rate is 14%. But the CBN provide an interest subsidy of 6% while the borrower pays 8% at full repayment. The 
purpose of ACSS is to facilitate the development of the agricultural sector by advancing credit to farmers at low 
interest rates. By pursuing this strategy, the government hopes to exert downward pressure on prices of 
agricultural produce, especially food, leading to reduced inflation, increased export, diversification of 
government revenue base, and increased foreign exchange earnings (Eze et al 2010: 7). According to a CBN 
(2012: 11) report on its real sector interventions in Nigeria, ACSS since inception has paid a total of 
N872.55million as rebate to 43 projects. 
 
2.3 ‘Agricultural Programmes’ for Providing Low-cost Credit to Farmers in Nigeria 
(i) National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), (1999 to date) 
 Like FEAP, NAPEP was established by the federal government of Nigeria. The mode of operation is 
tailored towards directed (subsidized) credit to farmers. The programme consists of four schemes namely, 
Youth empowerment scheme which involves capacity acquisition, mandatory attachment, and credit delivery; 
Rural infrastructures Development scheme which involves the provision of portable water, rural electrification, 
transportation and communication development; Social welfare Services Scheme which is involved with 
qualitative education, primary health care, farmers empowerment and provision of social services, provision of 
agricultural input and credit delivery to rural farmers; and Natural Resources Development and Conservation 
Scheme which contains programmes for environmental protection through conservation of land and space, 




(ii) Rural Banking Programme (1977 to 1991) 
 Banks were encouraged to not only establish rural branches but also to extend at least 50 per cent of 
the deposit mobilized from the rural areas as loans and advances to rural dwellers. Defaulting banks were to be 
penalized. 
 
(iii) National FADAMA Development programme (1993 - date) 
 This programme was aimed at increasing income of beneficiaries by at least 20%. The programme was 
designed in 1993 to promote simple and low cost improved irrigation technology under World Bank financing. 
FADAMA is a Hausa word for low lying flood plains usually with easily accessible shallow groundwater. It is a 
major instrument for achieving the government’s poverty reduction objective in rural areas of Nigeria. The 
beneficiaries are meant to come as a group known as FADAMA Community Association to the National 
FADAMA Development Programme. The programme empowers the association with resources, training, and 
technical assistance supports to properly manage and control the resources for their own development. 
FADAMA adopts a socially inclusive and participatory process in which all FADAMA users will collectively 
identify their development goals and pursue it when assisted .The programme is in its third phase currently due 
to its success in the States that first adopted it. 
 
(iv) Preferred Sector Allocation of Credit (1970 to 1996) 
  Banks were mandated to extend 40 per cent of their loans and advances to agriculture which was 
designated a preferred sector. Banks that failed to meet this target were penalized. The funds not lent were 
transferred to the then Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank, NACB. 
 
2.4 Innovations and Initiatives by the CBN to Improve Lending Under its Agricultural Credit Policies 
 To ensure that small farmers had the financial resources to widen their economic activities, the CBN 
initiated various models, products and strategies to improve lending under the Scheme. In specifics, these 
initiatives were introduced to either encourage lending bank to continue to lend to farmer and/or encourage 
farmer to repay the loans on schedule. Prominent among them are: 
 
(i). Self-Help Groups Linkage Banking Programme 
 The Self-Help Groups Banking Linkage Programme (SHGBLP) for savings mobilization was launched 
under the ACGSF in 1991 and became operational in 1992. Under the programme, farmers with a common 
purpose are encouraged to form groups of between 5 and 15 people. They can then undertake regular savings, 
which are deposited in a partner bank of their choice. After saving for six months, they may then apply to the 
partner bank for a loan. The groups can be informal or registered (formal). Bank loans to a group are normally 
in multiples of the balance in their savings account at the time of loan application. Under this programme, a 
lending bank holds the group savings as security, which cannot be drawn on until loans are repaid. The aim of 
the Self-Help Groups Linkage Banking is to inculcate a culture of savings and banking in group members and 
for them to build up resources for financing their farm projects without recourse to bank borrowing in the long 
run. So far, banks have advanced loans nationwide four times the total balance in the savings accounts. 
 
(ii)Trust Fund Model (TFM) 
 The Bank has widened the scope of Self-Help Groups Linkage Banking to include State Governments 
and blue chip companies willing to provide funds for farmers within their catchment areas or in the host 
communities where they operate. The intermediation is in the form of Trust Funds, which they deposit with 
partner lending banks to secure part of the banks’ exposures to farmers. Companies participating in the TFM 
include the following:  
(a) Micro Credit Scheme for Agricultural Development operated through the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company Ltd  
(b) Green Card in association with Nigerian Agip Oil Company Ltd  
(c) Total Oil Plc 
State Governments participating in the TFM are Nassarawa, Ebonyi, Kogi, Benue, Lagos, Jigawa, Kwara and 
Katsina States. Katsina State Government raised a rural development loan from the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development and placed part of it with a partner lending bank to enable it to extend credit to 
farmers. In all the programmes, savings of the farmer groups were used to secure 25 per cent of the loans, the 






(iii) Interest Drawback Programme (IDP)  
The IDP is a palliative introduced in 2004 to rebate interest to farmers who repay agricultural loans according to 
contractual terms. The IDP is designed to benefit farmers and entrepreneurs who borrow under the Agricultural 
Credit Guarantee Scheme. The current rebate is 40% of accrued interest. Farmers who fully repay their loans on 
time under the ACGS are refunded 40% of the interest on their agricultural loans.  
 
Table 4: Value and Number of Claims Filed and Settle under the IDP of ACGSF 
year 
Cum Claims Filed Claims Actually Settled Value of Unsettled 
Claims (N’million) Number Value Number Value 
2004 774 4,552,029 774 4,552,029 0 
2005 9455 33,204,930 8681 28,652,901 4,552,029 
2006 25251 81,930,151 15796 48,725,220 33,204,931 
2007 46027 172,248,266 20776 90,318,114 81,930,152 
2008 77176 312,740,809 31149 140,492,542 172,248,267 
2009 92721 424,313,445 15545 11,572,636 412,740,809 
2010 119137 632,768,875 26416 208,455,429 424,313,446 
April, 2011 129007 701,655,141 9870 68,886,265 632,768,876 
Source: Study 
 As is clear from table 4, the number and value of claims paid to benefiting customers has been on the 
ascendency. But a more perceptive review of the pattern of claims filed and settled indicates that the value of 
unsettled claims have consistently been increasing since the inception of the IDP in 2004; suggesting poor 
performance of the IDP in term of  providing incentives to farmers.  
 
III. Performance of Major Agricultural Credit policies 
 and Agriculture in Nigeria’s History 
 
3.1. Performance of the ACGSF 
 Earlier sections of this paper have highlighted several efforts made by the government of Nigeria 
through its various agencies to deepen investment in the agricultural sector as well as encourage small stake 
farmers to continue in agriculture. Apart from capacity building, a lot has been done to provide credit to the 
agricultural sector. It is, therefore, important to assess how the encouragement of the sector impacted on the 
overall growth and productivity of the sector. This section of the paper will, thus, take an empirical assessment 
of the performance of major agricultural credit policies and, generally, the growth of agricultural production in 
the country’s history 
 
(i.) Default Claims Filed by Commercial Banks and Settled by CBN 
 The CBN in its role as the managing agent of the ACGSF investigates the status of the default claims 
submitted by the lending banks and makes appropriate recommendations to the Board of the ACGSF for 
settlement. Claims settlement is central to the sustenance of the ACGS, in that Banks look forward to the 
payment of the 75% of the amount in default net the amount realized from the security pledged by the borrower 
as enshrined in the ACGSF guidelines (ACGSF guidelines, 2013). More importantly, the number and amount of 
loans filed in by the lending banks is a veritable pointer to the performance of agricultural loan granted under 
the scheme. A rising profile of the amount and number of loan filed points to misapplication of the facility as 
farmers can only liquidate their loans when it has been properly utilized. Table 5 presents the number and 
amount of claims filed and settled as well as the percentage of the later against claims filed. 
 





Cum. Claims Settled as a 
% of cum. Claims Filed 




No. (%) Amount 
(%) 
1978-1996 501 24712.5 153 820.2 30.54 3.32 
1978-1990 1132 65084.6 372 2695.8 32.86 4.14 
1978-2005 16478 1063718 8424 157841.7 51.12 14.83 
1978-2011 20093 1528323 9236 242586 45.97 15.87 
Source: Computed by Authors 
  
 
Note: The data used for the calculations are obtained from the Development Finance Office of the CBN and 
presented in table 2. 
 
 As is clear in table 5, from inception in 1978 to 2005, a total of 16,478 claims valued N1,063.72million 
were filed on the Fund. Out of these, 8,424 claims with a value of N157.841million, which represents 51.12% 
of the number and a paltry 14.83% of the value of the claims filed, were settled. Further, from 1978 to April 
2011, a total of 20,093 claims valued N1528.3million were filed by the lending banks on the Fund. Out of these, 
9,236 claims with a value of  N242.586million, which represents 45.97% of the number and 15.87% of the 
value of the claims filed, were settled. A cumulative claims settlement rate of 15.87% is too poor and points to 
the enormity of basic underlying factor(s) militating against prompt and full settlement of claims and the need 
to find these factor(s) and subsequently tackle them forthrightly. It also indicates the failure of the barrage of 
similar policies, programmes, schemes, institution, palliatives and several other similar measures (that have 
been suggested in the literature and implemented by government) to offer solution to the problem of non-
performing agricultural loans in Nigeria. 
 A cursory look at the consolidated statistics in table 2 reveals the trend of activities from inception of 
the scheme. The trend is further buttressed in figure 1. 
 




Note: Figure 1 is based on data in table 2. 
 
 Figure 1 shows that there were gradual increases in claims filed from 1978 to 1989. This was the 
period when government stipulated lending quota to banks under the ACGSF which resulted in gradual growth 
in the amount of loan guaranteed (table 2). The introduction of the structural adjustment programme in 1986 
and market liberalization in 1989/1990 (Olaitan 2006: 5) together with the removal of the lending quota in 1989 
did not solve the problem of persistent increases in default claims filed. Instead, the amount of default claims 
filed took a bullish trend from 1990 to 1995, remained relatively stable from 1996 to 2003 and rose 
astronomically to its zenith in 2004. This led the CBN to introduce some palliative measures such as the Interest 
Drawback Programme (IDP) in 2004; and Self-Help Group Linkage Banking in 1991, and the Trust Fund 
Model earlier reviewed. Were these measures able to improve loan performance and farmers’ loan repayment 
rate on a sustainable basis? The answer to this question forms the focus of the next sub-section. 
 
(ii.) Cumulative Loans Guaranteed to Farmer under ACGSF and Fully Repaid 
 
Table 6: Cumulative Loans Guaranteed to Farmer under ACGSF and Fully Repaid (1978-2011) 
years 
Total loan Guaranteed 
(analyzed by size) Total loan Fully repaid 
















192312 1420718.5 1035188.4 
57.85 
2001 20,298 728,545.40 19357 414452.7 314092.7 
56.89 











1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
CF = Claims Filed  by Lending Banks                                      





2003 24,303 1,164,460.40 21652 910181.2 254279.2 
78.16 
2004 35,035 2,083,744.70 26208 1171754.2 911990.5 
56.23 
2005 46,238 3,046,738.50 32549 1861097.1 1185641.4 
61.08 
2006 54,032 4,263,060.30 30808 2056601.75 2206458.55 
48.24 
2007 43,233 4,425,861.84 35794 2860723.51 1565138.33 
64.64 
2008 52,787 6,721,074.56 31,171 3067585.39 3653489.17 
45.64 
2009 53,639 8,349,509.28 34300 3621394.93 4728114.35 
43.4 
2010 50,849 7,740,507.63 50119 5850923.35 1889584.28 
75.6 
April, 
2011 41,856 7,623,216.25 9382 1375796.58 6247419.67 
`18.05 
 
740,056 49,772,826.56 502,227 25,425,415.95 24,347,411 
AVE=51.1% 
 
Source: Development Finance Department/Office, CBN; Figures for 1978-2000 are aggregated by the Author. 
Table 6 shows that ACGSF has made impressive strides in terms of loan guaranteed but performed 
abysmally in the area of loan repayment. From inception in 1978 to April 2011, the Fund has guaranteed a total 
of 740,056 loans valued at N49.8billion out of which N25.43billion were fully repaid. This represents a loan 
difference of N24.3billion and a repayment rate of 51.1% over the period. This further translates into a loan 
default rate of about 49%. A loan repayment rate of 51.1 % shows an unsustainable loan repayment profile for 
the ACGSF. This is further buttressed by the widening spread (gap) between the loan guaranteed and fully 
repaid under the scheme over the period under analysis (figure 2).This explains the unwillingness of many 
commercial banks to finance agriculture despite guarantees provided by the government. If loans are disbursed 
to farmers to align with agricultural season in Nigeria (figure 4), it will ensure optimal deployment and 
utilization of the fund in line with various stages of agricultural activities (figure 5). The tendency is that more 
farmers will repay their loan in order to garner the benefits accruable from various incentives and palliatives put 
in place by the government through its agencies. This would engender a reduction in loan default rate. The fact 
that farmers are generally unable to pay back the loans despite barrage of government policies and incentives 
implemented over the years points to the fact that the root cause of non-performing agricultural loan is yet to be 
addressed. 
 




Note: Data used for figure 2 were obtained from the Development Finance Office, CBN. 
 
3.2. Performance of Agriculture in Nigeria 
 Quite a lot has been discussed about funding of agriculture in this paper. Before we proceed to present 
our suggestion to strengthen the sector, it is important that we seek to know how the country’s agricultural 
sector is currently performing. We will, therefore, examine budget allocation to the sector and its performance 
in terms of productivity and contribution to GDP, among others.  
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 Public expenditure on agriculture which serves as the bedrock of financing for the sector has 
consistently fallen short of recommendations. In fact, the process of budgeting in Nigeria can be said to be 
detrimental, not only to agriculture, but to overall real growth and productive development. Over the past 10 
years (2002-2011), federal and state budgets have consistently been structured in such a manner that the 
recurrent expenditure (non-productive expenditure, including overheads, wages, emoluments, etc) have been 
allocated more than 65% of the total budget while less than 35% of the budget have been allocated to capital 
projects (the basis for infrastructural development and job creation, among others). This is glaring from table 1 
where the share of capital expenditure in total federal budget has been less than  35% for most part of the 
civilian regime in Nigeria’s fourth republic. 
 Again, since 2000, public spending on agriculture has been less than 2% of the federal budget except 
in 2008 when a paltry 2.02% of the total budget was allocated to agriculture (see figure 3; table 1). This had 
been corroborated by the Nigeria Agricultural Public Expenditure Review, a collaborative study carried out by 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank. The 2% share of agriculture in 
total federal budget is below the 10% goal set by African leaders under the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme, CAADP, in Maputo Mozambique (Maputo declaration 2003) and far below the 25% 
target set by the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO (Iganga and Umenhilin, 2011:83).The CAADP 
was established by the AU assembly in 2003 with focus on improving food security, nutrition, and increasing 
incomes in African farming economies. It aims to achieve this by raising agricultural productivity by at least 6% 
per year and increasing public investment in agriculture to 10% of national budget per year. 
 
Figure 3: Share of Agricultural Expenditure in Total Expenditure: 
 
Source: study 
Note: Figure 3 is drawn based on data in table 1 
 
From figure 3, the share of agriculture in total budget grossly falls short of the recommended level. It clearly 
shows that Nigerian’s agriculture is abysmally underfinanced. It is therefore not surprising that agricultural 
policies have failed to achieve the desired goals of food self-sufficiency, self-reliance, poverty reduction and 
rural development.  
 Table 7 shows the composition of government expenditure in Sub-Sahara Africa and other low-and 
middle-income countries. It indicates that Sub-Sahara African states have spent least on agriculture (than South 
Asia, Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific) relative to other sectors of the economy. In Sub-
Sahara Africa, it is glaring that not only have the economies spent least on agriculture and health, the share of 
agriculture in total expenditure has also been declining.This is supportive of the poor profile of agricultural 
expenditure in Nigeria. 
 
Table 7: Composition of Government Expenditures by Sectors and Region in Selected low- and Middle-income 
countries 
Region Year Agric 
(%) 
Defence(%) Education (%) Health 
(%) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific (8) 
1980 11.1 15.8 10.5 5.6 








1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
UN-FAO Recommended: 25%
'Maputo Declaration' : 10%
Actual % of agric exp. in total budget
(years)




2000 6.9 6.9 16.4 6.2 
2007 6.5 7.2 13.8 4.2 
Middle east and 
North Africa (7) 
1980 4.5 17.5 15.6 4.5 
1990 4.9 13.3 18.7 9 
2000 4.4 15.1 14.8 10.5 
2007 3.1 10.5 11.8 7.7 
South Asia (7) 1980 6.6 19.2 2.9 2 
1990 6.9 18.1 3.1 1.8 
2000 4.8 15.3 3.4 1.8 
2007 4.9 12.9 4.6 2.3 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
(10) 
1980 6 6.1 11.9 3.4 
1990 6 8.4 13.9 4.5 
2000 3.6 6.1 15.5 4.7 
2007 2.7 5.4 16.5 7.3 
Source: Adapted from Food and Agricultural Organization (2012:28) 
Note: Calculations include 32 low- and middle-income countries. The number of countries included in each 
group is shown in parenthesis. Computation is based on IFPRI, 2010. 
 
(ii) Agricultural Productivity and Share of AgriculturalOutput in total GDP 
 Agricultural productivity is defined as the ratio of physical output such as kilograms or tons of crop 
produced to the number of hectares of land used (efficiency of land productivity) or total man hours employed 
(agricultural labour productivity). Thus productivity in the agricultural sector can be analyzed in terms of the 
total yield from the four major sub-sectors, namely, crops, livestock, fishery and forestry. In a World Bank 
report published in 2012, Cereal yield (kg per hectare) in Nigeria was last reported at 1,413 tons per hectare in 
2010. The Cereals includes wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, and mixed grains. 
Production data on cereals relate to crops harvested for dry grain only. Cereal crops harvested for hay or 
harvested green for food, feed, or silage and those used for grazing are excluded. As figure 4 shows, over the 
past 30 years, this indicator reached a maximum value of 1,655.40 in 1981 and a minimum value of 1094 in 
1991. In the World Bank (2012) report, productivity in Nigeria’s agricultural sector was shown to have been 
very low. This has been corroborated by the present government’s confirmation that the poor Nigeria’s 
agricultural production output is an unacceptable situation that has to be changed. According to Vice President 
Mohammed Namadi Sambo 
“It’s unfortunate that, it’s only in Nigeria that the average production is 1.3 tons per hectare 
when there are neighboring countries in Africa with an average production of 8 tons per hectare. 
This is unacceptable and we plan to change it.” (Peoples’ Daily Newspaper, March 29, 2012) 
 
Figure 4: Agricultural Productivity - Cereal Yield (kg per hectare) in Nigeria 
 
Source: World Bank report, 2012. 
 
Statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (2012), indicates that agriculture has contributed more to the 
national GDP than oil and gas and has thus remained a significant component of the national economy, 
employing over 60% of Nigeria’s 150 million people. From table 1, the share of agricultural output in total 
output (GDP) were 32.7% in 2007; 32.9% in 2008; 37% in 2009; 30% in 2010; and 30.9% in 2011. Yet the 
sector has remained substantially small scaled (with respect to output rather than cultivated acreage) attracting 
  
 
very little investment. Thus, it can be seen that the modest contribution of agriculture to GDP has resulted from 
rising cultivated acreage rather than rise in productivity in the sector. 
 
 
IV. The Conceptual Framework – Seasonality Model 
 
4.1 Background 
 Literature is replete with the failure of policies to adequately address agricultural intensification in 
Nigeria. Many experts have suggested several causes as being responsible for non-performance of agricultural 
loans and the huge rate of default. Such highlighted suggestions have been adopted by government in recent and 
roll-over programmes to test effectiveness of research and suggestions, but the problem has not been addressed. 
The sector is still sluggish; loans are not performing as repayment rate is still low; agricultural productivity is 
still low and banks are averse to granting loans to the sector. These informed our interest to search further so as 
to unearth the variable(s) that had perpetuated the present sluggish situation. While analyzing loans and 
disbursement to agricultural sector, we discovered from the disbursement flow that a serious mismatch was 
committed. Loans were paid out to farmers arbitrarily without matching with farming seasons. This provided 
the basis for the model suggested to solve the problem of non-performing agricultural loans in Nigeria, the 
Seasonality Model. 
 A situation where commercial banks’ loan decisions are tied to government’s fiscal activities, as well 
as, CBN’s monetary decisions, made loans to agricultural sector to be restricted to economy-wide fiscal and 
monetary decision structure. Commercial banks will, for instance, wait for government budget and CBN 
monetary policy guidelines before deciding on loans to beneficiaries. The purposes for which loans are to be 
disbursed are scarcely considered in the decision taking space. In many occasions, Nigerian government will 
not bring out its budget until mid-year. The CBN will also depend on the ‘spirit’ of the budget to decide its 
monetary policy direction. Deducing further it can be noticed clearly that based on current practice of 
institutions mentioned above, loans will not get to farmers until, perhaps mid-year, when farming had already 
begun. The seasonality model highlights the importance of credit alignment with agricultural seasons in Nigeria. 
 
4.2 Seasonality Model 
 The seasonality model indicates the various agricultural seasons in Nigeria, how agriculture is 
intensified in these seasons and how necessary it would be for lending banks to align credit disbursement with 
these seasons. Nigeria has two major seasons, Dry Season and Rainy season. Some parts of the dry season is 
dry, windy and dusty (the harmattan). This season covers the period from October to March and also the month 
of August, which is referred to as the ‘August break’. Notably, in the twelve months period of a year, the dry 
season, which is very inclement for agriculture, takes seven months. Figure 5 presents agricultural season that is 





 As shown in figure 5, the wet or rainy season starts in April effectively, recedes in July and continues 
in September. This season ushers in rain for purposes of agriculture and it covers a period of five months only. 
 
 
 For agricultural investors, particularly farmers, they need to undertake the following processes before 
they commence cultivation: 
(a) Land Preparation – In traditional and subsistence agriculture as mostly practiced in Nigeria, this period 




(b) Looking for seedlings – While preparing the land, many farmers go on to acquire seedlings that will be 
used in the farms. Such seedlings are sourced and prepared prior to planting after land preparation and after the 
early rains. 
(c) Building farm settlements – In instances where farms are far away from community settlements, 
temporary farm huts and settlements are constructed during land preparation. This is to provide temporary 
shelter and settlement for farm workers. In many cases farmers migrate to live in these settlements during the 
full farming seasons. 
(d) Arranging for purchasing of farm implement and equipment – Purchase and acquisition of farm 
implements come before and during land preparation stages. Hoes, matches, diggers, storage barns, etc., are all 
purchased for use in the stage of farm preparation. 
All of these include things that the farmer will do in the preparatory stages. Planting of farm products 
or agricultural cultivation in Nigeria is done mostly in the wet or rainy season. This is because the farmers need 
quite a quantity of water to irrigate their farms. And since Dams are too costly to be constructed by these 
farmers, they resort to planting in the rainy season. This means that farmers have only between April and 
September, excluding, even August, to cultivate their farm. For any farmer to expect good harvest in the dry 
season or harvest period, all preparations for planting must be completed before the start of cultivation 
(implementation). Anything short of this will mean that the farmer will be late and may even postpone 
cultivation for the season. Figure 6 shows the various stages in agricultural practice in the country. 




 As is clear from the foregoing presentations, agricultural loans expected by farmers are, therefore, for 
purposes of activating the farming process from the planning to implementation and even harvest stages. If any 
of these stages are skipped, there is a tendency for ‘farming failure’. It therefore implies that if farmers expect to 
have good and better yield, they have to pass through the three stages in their production process. If they require 
credit to do this, lending banks must disburse the credit to farmers prior to the commencement of activities in 
stage 1. If loans are disbursed to farmers after the activities in stage 1 had commenced, then farmers would miss 
activities in Stage 1, a prerequisite for Stages 2 and 3, which also remains very key in the production process. 
 So, when are credits disbursed to the farmers? Do Banks consider the seasons while granting 
agricultural loans? Lending banks in Nigeria tend to take credit decisions without any relation to the complexity 
of the farming season. They bundle agricultural credit into the bunch of other credit sectors of the economy. 
They do not disaggregate to see when, why, and where agricultural credit is extended. In many cases banks in 
Nigeria start their banking year in the preparatory period for farming. It is also interesting to note that 
government fiscal budget also start in that early period of the year. In most cases, bank credit goes to farmers at 
harvest seasons (Stage 3), while in other cases it goes to them sometimes in Stage 2. If this happens, there is a 
tendency for the farmer to misapply the credit. Alternatively, the farmer may want to try rushing and/or mixing 
activities of the various stages to apply the credit.The result of either or both of these scenarios is inevitable; the 
misapplication of the loan facility, poor harvest, and high default rate. All of these translate to poor performance 
of agricultural loan. 
 
V. Summary Of Major Findings And policy Implications 
5.1 Summary of Major Findings 
 The findings from this study indicate that ACGSF made impressive strides in terms of the number and 
amount of loan guaranteed but performed abysmally in the area of loan repayment. A loan repayment rate of 
51.1 % which implies a default rate of about 49% points to an unsustainable loan repayment profile for the 




















































provided by the government.That farmers are generally unable to repay the loans despite the barrage of 
government policies, incentives and palliatives implemented over the years point to the fact that the root cause 
of non-performing agricultural loan is yet to be addressed. From the disbursement flow of the loans, it was 
discovered that a serious mismatch was committed as loans were paid out to farmers arbitrarily without 
matching with farming seasons. The divergence between the period loans are disbursed to farmers and the 
commencement of agricultural activities manifest in misapplication and poor loan performance. 
There is also the problem of poor settlement of claims filed under the ACGSF and its IDP. While the rising 
trend of unsettled claims under the ACGSF discourages banks from lending to agriculture, poor settlement of 
claims under the IDP serves to discourage farmers from repaying their loans on schedule, or worse still, 
discourage them from applying for loans under the scheme. A cumulative claims settlement rate of 15.87% 
under the ACGSF is too poor and, again, indicates the enormity of basic underlying factor(s) militating against 
prompt and full settlement of claims. 
 Qualified evidence from the study has also shown that the process of budgeting in Nigeria is 
detrimental, not only to agriculture, but to overall real growth and productive development. Over the past 10 
years (2002-2011), 65% of the total budget have been allocated to recurrent expenditure (unproductive 
expenditure) while less than 35% of the budget have been allocated to capital projects (the basis for 
infrastructural development and job creation, among others). This poor and unproductive budget structure has 
been made worse by poor funding of the Nigeria’s agricultural sector. In fact, agriculture has been abysmally 
underfunded with the share of agricultural expenditure in total federal budget (expenditure) averaging a paltry 
0.81% over the past decade (2001-2011), (see table1). The 0.81% share of agriculture in total federal budget is 
below the 10% goal set by African leaders under the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Programme, CAADP, in Maputo Mozambique (Maputo declaration 2003) and far below the 25% target set by 
the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO. The study further shows that agriculture has contributed 
more to the national GDP than oil and gas and has thus remained a significant component of the national 
economy, employing over 60% of Nigeria’s 150 million people. The sector has, however, remained 
substantially small scaled (with respect to output rather than cultivated acreage) attracting very little investment.  
 
5.2 Implication of Findings for Policy 
 Loan default in agriculture is an enormous problem as it is a major contributor to the persistent poor 
performance of Nigerian agricultural sector. It serves to reduce the amount of loan accommodation extended to 
agriculture because of the perceived risk of default in payment. Consequently, agricultural production is harm-
strung by inadequacy of circulating capital. This tends to perpetuate the vicious cycle of poverty characterizing 
the small-holder farmers who constitute over 70% of the Nigerian populace. 
 Granted that Nigeria’s agricultural sector is abysmally underfunded and the general pattern of federal 
budget detrimental to agricultural productivity and overall real growth, why have the barrage of policies and 
incentives to provide cheap loans to the sector continued to fail? Evidently, the mismatch of credit disbursement 
with seasons attenuated growth and productivity of agriculture in Nigeria, resulting in poor loan performance. 
This manifests in high loan delinquency and default rate. This is the nitty-gritty of non-performing agricultural 
loan in Nigeria.  
 An innovative strategy capable of solving the problem of default in agricultural financing and as such 
aiding the process of enhanced agricultural productivity and national development is the Seasonality Model 
(SM) suggested in this paper 
 
APENDICES 1 
 Table 1: Share of Agricultural expenditure in Total Federal Budget, share of Capital 






























1970 716.10 187.80 903.9 1.92 0.21 2,576.40 5,281.10 48.8 20.77 
1971 823.60 173.60 997.2 3.86 0.38 3,033.70 6,650.90 45.61 17.40 
1972 1,012.30 451.30 1463.6 8.89 0.6 3,092.70 7,187.50 43.03 30.83 
1973 963.50 569.70 1529.2 10.75 0.07 3,261.20 8,630.50 37.79 37.25 
1974 1,517.10 1,223.5
0 
2740.6 13.77 0.502 4,377.90 18,823.10 23.2 44.64 






7856.7 11.71 0.149 6,121.96 26,655.78 22.9 51.4 
1977 3,819.20 5,004.6
0 
8823.8 29.38 0.332 7,401.64 31,520.34 23.48 56.7 
1978 2,800.00 5,200.0
0 
8000 8.69 0.108 8,033.55 34,540.10 23.2 65 
1979 3,187.20 4,219.5
0 
7400.7 9.15 0.123 9,213.14 41,974.70 21.9 57.01 
1980 4,805.20 10,163.
30 
14968.5 17.14 0.114 10,011.46 49,632.32 20.1 67.89 
1981 4,846.70 6,567.0
0 
11413.7 13.03 0.114 13,580.32 47,619.66 28.5 57.53 
1982 5,506.00 6,417.2
0 
11923.2 14.80 0.124 15,905.50 49,069.28 32.4 53.82 
1983 4,750.80 4,885.7
0 
9636.5 12.77 0.132 18,837.19 53,107.38 35.47 50.6 
1984 5,827.50 4,100.1
0 
9927.6 15.66 0.157 23,799.43 59,622.53 39.9 41.30 
1985 7,576.40 5,464.7
0 
13041.1 20.36 0.156 26,625.21 67,908.55 39.2 41.9 
1986 7,696.90 8,526.8
0 



































































































































































































2007 1,589,27 759,32 2450897 32,48 1.325 6,757,867. 20,657,31 32.71 30.98 
  
 















































Source: Nigerian Bureau of Statistic, CBN Statistical Bulletin 2012 
Note: SCTE=Share of Capital Expenditure in total Federal budget; CE=Capital Expenditure; RE=Recurrent 
Expenditure 
 
TABLE 2: Default Claims (Filed by Lending Banks and Settled by CBN) and cumulative Amount and Number 




Claims Filed Claims Settled 
 
cum. Loan Guaranteed 








 N0. Amt (N' 000) 
1978 - 0 0 0 0 341 11,284.40 
1979 - 0 0 0 0 1,105 33,596.70 
1980 1086 18 90 0 0 945 30,945.00 
1981 1,655 38 613 0 0 1,295 35,642.40 
1982 1,63 53 3427.6 36 241.3 1,076 31,763.90 
1983 1,526 52 3680 24 147.9 1,333 36,307.50 
1984 1,266 121 3880 0 0 1,642 24,654.90 
1985 1,242 94 6636.5 93 431 3,337 44,243.60 
1986 1,156 125 6385.4 0 0 5,203 68,417.40 
1987 1,203 85 2155.6 68 534.1 16,209 102,152.50 
1988 1,305 150 7933.1 52 380.2 24,538 118,611,00 
1989 1,252 160 8526.6 48 191.2 34,518 129,300.30 
1990 1,147 236 21756.8 51 770.1 30,704 98,494.40 
1991 1,094 810 27972.5 67 253.7 22,014 82,107.40 
1992 1,163 1362 31509.5 65 363.3 21,206 88,031.80 
1993 1,153 998 28659.1 91 455.9 15,514 80,845.80 
1994 1,132 1263 60525.9 56 222.6 16,572 103,186.00 
1995 1,210 598 60149.9 130 2817.6 18,079 164,162.10 
1996 1,220 442 5402.9 166 1090.4 18,036 225,502.50 
1997 1,182 232 5181.6 690 6134.2 17,840 242,038.20 
1998 1,201 78 2746.7 826 6906.2 14,637 215,697.20 
1999 1,239 79 2488.8 498 5471.3 12,859 246,082.50 
2000 1,171 173 8044.3 288 1691.2 14,102 361,450.40 
2001 1,233 312 7216.4 436 6405 20,298 728,545.40 
2002 1,255 206 6078.3 124 3210.2 23,681 1,051,589.80 
2003 1,308 506 9236.3 168 3440.3 24,303 1,164,460.40 
2004 1,372 213 11575.1 2065 97902 35,035 2,083,744.70 
2005 1,421 8074 731846 2382 18782 46,238 3,046,738.50 
2006 1,507 1215 129986 256 16344 54,032 4,263,060.30 
2007 1,399 517 31791.9 165 23324 43,233 4,425,861.84 
2008 1,598 529 46624 44 2033.8 52,787 6,721,074.56 
2009 1,528 54 31375.1 38 14232 53,639 8,349,509.28 
2010 1,413 410 74482.3 285 19103.6 50,849 7,740,507.63 
2011 - 890 150345 24 9706.4 41,856 7,623,216.25 
 
20093 1528323 9236 242586 740,056 49,772,826.56 
  
 
Source: Development Finance Department, CBN.  
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